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Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey:
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title
By Fairfax Leary, Jr.* and David Frisch**

GENERAL PROVISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS
As in the past, there were no significant developments or trends in the few
decisions on conflict of laws points. The text of U.C.C. section 1-105, 1 the
Code's general choice-of-law provision, speaks comprehensively of "the transaction." Yet recent cases and a draft of the proposed Personal Property Leasing
Act 2 take an issue-oriented approach, thus giving the parties greater freedom to
specify choice of law. Following the formulation in section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws, the draft Leasing Act supports party
choice in the absence of some significant forum policy that requires overriding
that choice. 3
*Mr. Leary is a member of the Pennsylvania, New York, and District of Columbia bars and
Distinguished Senior Professor of Law at The Delaware Law School of Widener University in
Wilmington.
**Mr. Frisch is a member of the Rhode Island bar and Associate Professor of Law at the same
university.
Don L. Baker of Austin, Texas, and Fairfax Leary, Jr. are cochairmen of the Subcommittee on
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title. The following members of the
subcommittee contributed to the writing of this survey: Anthony Adams, Marvin E. Barkin, Calvin
W. Corman, Joseph J. Gazzoli, Lawrence B. Hunt, Dennis S. Kayes, Ann Lousin, Susan M.
Mann, John E. Murray, Jr., Jeffrey L. Raney, Michael D. Strobehn (assisted by Beverly A.
Zimmerman), Victor A. Vilaplana, and William R. Waddell.
Editor's note: This article and the one that follows are a continuation of the survey of 1984
developments under the Uniform Commercial Code. Other sections of the survey appeared in the
May 1985 issue of The Business Lawyer.
1. All references to the U.C.C. are to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1978 Official Text.
2. The Leasing Act is being drafted under the aegis of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). The reporters are Ronald DeKoven, Esq. of the New York
bar and Professor James A. Martin of the Michigan Law School. The draft was submitted for a
first reading to the commissioners at their summer 1984 meeting at Keystone, Colorado, July
27-August 3, 1984. It has not been approved by the commissioners, the committee, or the reporters.
3. Draft of Personal Property Leasing Act No. 5, at 20-21 (Mar. 3, 1985) (not approved by the
NCCUSL, its subcommittee, or the reporters). The proposed language may not be used to ascertain
the legislative meaning of any promulgated final law. Subsection (a) of§ 107 of the draft Leasing
Act reads as follows:
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In the consumer context, the Leasing Act draft, both in choice of law and in
choice of forum, 4 negates certain choice-of-law agreements in order to protect
consumers from the inconvenience of a distant forum 5 or strange rules of law. In
cases considering commercial transactions involving banks, even when U.C.C.
section 4-102(2) is not applicable, courts have adopted the law of the state in
which the bank is located. 6
Perhaps consideration should be given to whether both the Code and the
proposed Leasing Act should also permit the parties to agree to be governed by
the terms of a particular trade practice code, even though it is not, as such, the
law of any particular jurisdiction. 7
In one leasing case, In re loop Hospital Partnerships, 8 the court noted that
under U.C.C. sections 9-102 and 9-103, the applicable law could differ depending upon the issue, that is, "repossession and resale" versus "validity," rather
than selecting one jurisdiction for the entire transaction, thus apparently adopting an "issue" approach.
In Hammermill Paper Co. v. Pipe Systems, lnc.,9 Hammermill sued Pipe in
Pennsylvania for breach of warranty. Seeking indemnification, Pipe impleaded
Subject to subsections (c) and (d), the parties may agree that the law of this State or of another
jurisdiction govern their rights and duties under the lease if the particular issue is one that the
parties may resolve by agreement under this [Act]. Even if the issue is not one that the parties
may resolve by agreement under this [Act], the parties may agree that the law of this State or of
another jurisdiction govern their rights and duties under the lease unless:
( 1) the law chosen is that of a jurisdiction having no substantial relationship with the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice; or
(2) application of the law chosen would be contrary to the fundamental policy of the
jurisdiction whose law would otherwise be chosen by the applicable choice of law rules of
this State, including subsection (b).
Subsection (b) directs the court to apply "the law of the jurisdiction that has the most significant
relation with the lease." Subsection (c) states a special rule for consumer leases, namely, either the
law of the residence of the consumer "at the time the lease agreement becomes enforceable or within
30 days thereafter or in which the goods are to be used." Any other choice is without effect.
4. Id. § 108, at 23.
5. Id. §§ 107 (c), (d).
6. Banco Nacional de Desarrollo v. Mellon Bank, 726 F.2d 87, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1651 (3d Cir. 1984); Barclays Discount Bank, Ltd. v. Bogharian Bros., 568 F. Supp. 1116
(C.D. Cal. 1983); Israel Discount Bank, Ltd. v. Rosen, 59 N.Y.2d 428, 452 N.E.2d 1213, 465
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1983).
7. The connict-of-laws provisions in both the U.C.C. and the Leasing Act make no reference to
trade practice. In Banco Nacional de Desarrollo v. Mellon Bank, 726 F.2d at 90 n.5, 37 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 1655 n.5, the Third Circuit stated that the Uniform Customs and Practices for
Documentary Credits did not qualify as "the substantive law of a state" for adoption by the parties.
8. 35 Bankr. 929, 938, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1679, 1692 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
9. 581 F. Supp. 1189, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1984). The court cited
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 ( 1964 ), Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws§ 147, and Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1311-13 (3d Cir.
1978). In considering the second part of Pennsylvania's analysis and the Restatement's flexible twopart analysis, the court found that the issue of products liability law involved policy interests of
considerable consequence to Pennsylvania because the damages occurred in Pennsylvania. See also
First Nat'! Bank v. Insurance Centers, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (citing
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its supplier under a distributorship agreement that designated Texas law, and
also asserted a products liability claim. The third-party defendant moved for
summary judgment based on Texas law and a one-year contractual bar to
claims in the distributorship agreement.
The court applied Texas law to the third-party warranty claim and granted
the supplier's motion. The distributorship agreement did not govern the strict
liability claim, however, and the court turned to Pennsylvania's general choiceof-law rules in tort and strict liability cases. It determined that Pennsylvania
law applied. Again, this was an "issue" approach.

HYBRID SALES AND SERVICE CASES
A distributorship agreement calling for a "host of service responsibilities"
nevertheless was subject to article 2 as the "sale of goods was the raison d'etre of
the Agreements." 10 A printing contract was held to be a sale of the finished
magazines so that no consideration was needed for a modification under U.C.C.
section 2-209. 11
In other cases, even though the contract was held not to be subject to article 2
either as a service contract 12 or as a federal contract, 13 the provisions of the Code
were applied. Of seventeen cases reviewed, fourteen applied the U.C.C. on one
basis or another, 14 indicating the need, in the area of commercial service
contracts, for more available guidance than the common law provides.
In Hudson v. Town & Country True Value Hardware, lnc., 15 the Tennessee
Supreme Court, unlike the courts that applied the U.C.C. at the parties'
Phillips v. Englehart, 437 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968), applying the law of a state to which
" 'some element of the contract is properly referrable' "). The Insurance Centers court also likened
the U.C.C. § 1-105 tests to the rule of Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403
(1927). Section 106(a)(2) of the draft Leasing Act more concretely permits the disregard of the
contractual choice-of-law clause when its purpose is to evade a fundamental policy of the otherwise
applicable jurisdiction's law.
10. WICO Corp. v. Willis Indus., 567 F. Supp. 352, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 20
(N .D. Ill. 1983 ). An installation contract for components of a cold storage room had as its dominant
aspect the sale of the coinponents, the trial court concluded; on appeal, both parties agreed that the
U.C.C. applied. Mayflower Farms v. Tech-Mark, Inc., 64 Or. App. 121, 666 P.2d 1384, 37 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 25 (1983); accord O'Keefe Elevator Co. v. Second Ave. Properties, Ltd., 216
Neb. 170, 343 N.W.2d 54, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1100 (1984) (wheelchair lift, parties
tried as U.C.C. case). In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., No. 37 W.D. Appeal Docket 1984
(Pa. Feb. 22, 1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the U.C.C. applied to a contract
for the construction of a 1,000-foot self-unloading vessel that, although immovable during the
special construction, would be movable after launching.
1I. Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, 120 Ill. App. 3d 907, 458 N.E.2d 1027, 37 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1460 (1983).
12. Liberty Fin. Management Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1471 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
13. Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 730 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1984)
(lease and sale of tugboat).
14. Several are not specifically discussed.
15. 666 S.W.2d 51, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 6 (Tenn. 1984). There were separate
contracts, one for the real estate and one for the personalty. The latter was conditioned upon the
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behest, 16 consolidated two separate contracts covering the sale of a business and
applied the dominant interest test, treating the whole as a sale of real estate
breached by the buyer. The court reversed a decision of the court of appeals,
which required separate awards of damages for the personalty contract and the
real estate contract, and reinstated the trial court's award to the seller of the
difference between the total of the two contract prices and the price received by
the seller on a subsequent sale to another.

ARTICLE 2-SALES
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
One situation not well handled by the Code, in view of its statute of frauds, is
the obligation, if any, of a subcontractor submitting an oral offer to be used by a
contractor in its bid for a contract. 17 This problem arose in H.B. Alexander &
Son v. Miracle Recreation Equipment Co. 18 The court refused to allow the
supplier to use the statute of frauds to escape from a bad deal. Ignoring certain
contentions of the parties, 19 the court concluded that the parties, by their conduct
and course of dealing, had waived compliance with the statute of frauds. 20
The result is correct, but the use of waiver and course of dealing can be
faulted. 21 The court would have been on firmer ground had it based its

closing of the land sale. The land sale was conditioned upon the buyer's obtaining financing. Since
the buyer's efforts to obtain financing "were inadequate," the trial court found the buyer in default.
16. See O'Keefe Elevator Co. v. Second Ave. Properties, Ltd., 216 Neb. 170, 343 N.W.2d 54, 37
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1100 (1984).
17. U.C.C. § 2-205 on firm offers does not solve the problem, as it requires the irrevocable offer
by a merchant to be in a signed writing. Also, many subcontractor-general contractor cases fall
outside the Code as service contracts, not sales of goods.
18. 314 Pa. Super. 1, 460 A.2d 343, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 750 (1983).
19. Alexander, the general contractor, had, upon receiving the award, sent a vendor's order as an
unanswered memorandum to a merchant. Miracle responded by arguing that the order was
insufficient because it did not indicate that it was confirming a contract and the clause "to make any
agreement valid sign, date and return copy at once. Advise definite shipping date and if by rail or
truck" was an impermissible condition precedent. Id. at 3 n.2, 460 A.2d at 344 n.2, 36 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. at 751 n.2.
20. Recognizing the importance of the bidding issue, the court said:
It is essential that general contractors be allowed to accept and rely on telephone bids from
subcontractors in arriving at their final bids since time is often an important factor. Clearly
[Miracle] was aware of this generally accepted custom and in fact often used this practice in its
transactions with general contractors.

Id. at 5-6, 460 A.2d at 345, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 752-53.
21. The relevance of course of conduct, or course of dealing and even usage of trade, lies in their
use in de1ermining the meaning to be given to the terms of an agreement, not in making the
agreement enforceable in the teeth of U.C.C. § 2-201. Tot~lly ignored by the court was comment 2
to U.C.C. § 1-102, which provides that "the statute of frauds found in Section 2-201 ... does not
explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a writing, but a fair reading denies enforcement to such a waiver as part of the 'contract' made unenforceable." It is noteworthy that there is no
mention of "waiver" in U.C.C. § 1-103.
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conclusions on an estoppel exception to the statute of frauds under U.C.C.
section 1-103. 22
The merchant's exception to the statute of frauds, avoided by the court in the
preceding case, arose in Great Western Sugar Co. v. Lone Star Donut Co. 23 The
writing sent by the seller seven weeks after the alleged oral agreement concluded, "This letter is a written confirmation of our agreement. Please sign and
return to me the enclosed counterpart of this letter signalling your acceptance of
the above agreement." 2•
The court ignored the difference between compliance with the statute of
frauds and the benefits of a signed written agreement which would preclude
much litigation over its terms. Should it not be possible while confirming an oral
contract to try for a written contract in addition? The court laconically ruled
that "[a] true confirmation requires no response." 25 This may be true, but to
have a written agreement to eliminate potential controversy requires writings
signed by both parties.
Perhaps with more careful drafting, the dual purpose can be served. The key
may be in the use of the words "signaUing your acceptance" of this agreement.
What would the judge have done with a sentence requesting a signed return
"signalling your concurrence that all of the terms and conditions herein stated
are a part of our contract" 26 ?
Issues regarding the sufficiency of the writings and whether a check for
$250,000 brought a contract to buy an $8.85 million aircraft within the partial
payment rule of U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c) arose in Songbird jet Ltd. v. Amax,
Inc.21 The judge ruled incorrectly that the statute requires that one document,
on its own, must be "sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made." 28 But the judge agreed that a check for $250,000 would indeed be
22. A promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds has been applied before. See, e.g.,
Allen M. Campbell Co., Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Virginia Metal Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 930, 36
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 384 (4th Cir. 1983); Northwest Potato Sales, Inc. v. Beck, 37
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1468 (Mont. 1984 ). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 139 (1981); Annot.-Promissory Estoppel as Basis for Avoidance of Statute of Frauds, 56
A.L.R.3d 1037 (1974).
23. 567 F. Supp. 340, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 721 F.2d 510
(5th Cir. 1983).
24. 567 F. Supp. at 342, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 37.
25. Id. at 342, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 38.
26. The imprecision of the English language is indicated here. "Acceptance" can be misunderstood as being used with the meaning "This is an offer needing a legal acceptance." Alternatively,
"acceptance" can mean a request for a written concurrence that the "confirmation" correctly stated
everything contained therein. Of course, for a memorandum to be "in confirmation," it must use
words such as "as per agreement," "in confirmation of," or "sold to buyer." Howard Constr. Co. v.
Jeff Cole Quarries, Inc., 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1040, 1047 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
27. 581 F. Supp. 912, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 431(S.D.N.Y.1984).
28. Id. at 922, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 441. The judge overlooked the explanation of the
language in comment 1 stating that all "that is required is that the writing afford a basis for
believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction." Fortunately, the one document
position is not shared by all courts, nor even by some members of the same court. See, e.g., East Eur.
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"unintelligible," or at least "extraordinary ," 29 unless referable to an oral agreement of some sort.
Section 2-201 (1) clearly states that a sufficient writing must contain a
quantity term. Slocomb Industries, Inc. v. Chelsea Industries 30 held that a
writing is sufficient if it "indicates that the quantity to be delivered under the
contract is a party's requirements or output."31 Unfortunately, not all courts
have been so commercially minded when presented with open quantity terms. 32

CONTRACT FORMATION
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
There is a difference between "sales in law" and "sales in practice." The
Code's attempt to harmonize the two may work well enough for the large
organization with batteries of forms and with personnel carefully trained in
their use. But for smaller businesses, "one form fits all" seems to be the rule.
American Bronze Corp. v. Streamway Products33 illustrates the chameleonlike nature of purchase order forms. The central element is the purchase order
number used for transactional identification and processing. On its face, as
worded, the purchase order appears to be an offer. 34 But a professional buyer
may use the form in two other ways. One would be as an acceptance of an offer
to sell, and some courts have, in certain circumstances, accepted its use for that
purpose. 35 Another would be as a confirmation of an oral contract.
American Bronze involved four transactions in which the buyer, following
what had been done for more than twenty years, "would first call in the order
by telephone and then follow it up with a written purchase order at which time
[the seller] would begin production." 36
After three purchase orders were placed, the seller began production and then
refused to. deliver. Its stated reason was that the buyer had placed with other
Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Island Creek Coal Sales Co., 572 F. Supp. 702, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
29. 581 F. Supp. at 923, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 442 (citing Anostario v. Vicinanzo, 59 N.Y.2d
662, 664, 450 N.E.2d 215, 216, 463 N.Y.S.2d 409, 410 (1983) (mem.) (quoting Burns v.
McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 232, 135 N.E. 273, 273 (1922))).
30. 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
31. Id. at 1548 (citing Eastern Dental Corp. v. Isaac Masel Co., 502 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Pa.
1980)). See In re Estate of Frost, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1476 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983),
where, in an analogous situation, the court held that "all wood sawable" was a valid quantity term.
32. See generally Bruckel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's Corruption of the UCC's
Substantive Provisions-The Quantity Problem, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 811.
33. 8 Ohio App. 3d 223, 456 N.E.2d 1295, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 687 (1982).
34. See, e.g., J.B. Moore Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 221 Va. 745,
273 S.E.2d 553, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1224 (1981).
35. See, e.g., Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mack Constr., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 540 P.2d 978
(1975). On the other hand, a purchase order may merely evidence an offer rather than a prior oral
contract. See Nations Enter., Inc. v. Process Equip. Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655, 24
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828 (1978).
36. 8 Ohio App. 3d at 227, 456 N.E.2d at 1300, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 691.
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sellers purchase orders that seller could also have filled. The fourth purchase
order was rejected and returned four days after it was placed. 37
Crucial to a determination of liability on the fourth transaction is what was
said by the seller when receiving the telephone order. 38 Apparently, the issue of
the fourth transaction was not raised on appeal. 39 If it was, the court's treatment
of the previous purchase orders as offers accepted under U.C.C. section 2-206
by the beginning of production precluded a finding that the return of the fourth
purchase order was a breach.
In re Isis Foods, lnc. 40 is a case in which on receipt of a purchase order, the
seller shipped the goods and also sent an invoice containing different terms.
Which was the acceptance? The buyer's purchase order was F.O.B. destination,
and the invoice contained the term "Our liability ceases upon delivery of the
merchandise to the carrier." If the shipment occurred before the seller dispatched the invoice, and there is some indication of this, at best the invoice was a
request for modification not accepted by the buyer. If the dispatch of the invoice
occurred before the shipment, it could constitute a counteroffer, or if it was
construed as or contained "a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance,"
a U.C.C. section 2-207 question would arise. Interesting, from the viewpoint of
contract interpretation, is the court's conclusion that even if part of the contract,
"the term in the invoice . . . does not clearly negate the provision that ...
defendant bore the responsibility for delivery of the goods [to buyer] .... " 41 Not
made clear, however, is just how the two terms could be construed as being in
harmony. 42

37. At one point, the court appeared to find an offer in the purchase order and an acceptance in
the beginning of production. Hence, when no production was begun, there was no acceptance.
U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
38. Without discussing what was said, the trial court characterized the purchase orders as
"confirming a telephone order." Trial Court's Finding of Fact 5 adopted by the court of appeals.
8 Ohio App. 3d at 226, 456 N.E.2d at 1298, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 689.
39. It was not discussed, and the court of appeals, after referring to the finding as to the three
preceding orders, stated, "We agree and hold that the parties did enter into the three contracts in
issue," 8 Ohio App. 3d at 227, 456 N.E.2d at 1300, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 692. Added confusion
results from the court's discussion of the statute of frauds. First, the court seemed to treat the
purchase order as a U.C.C. § 2-201(2) confirmatory memorandum, and then it stated that the
seller's acceptance (apparently referring to the beginning of production) "was sufficient to indicate
that these contracts for sale had been made." Id. at 228, 456 N.E.2d at 1301, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
at 692. This does not seem to fit any of the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-201.
40. 38 Bankr. 48, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1134 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
41. Id. at 50, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1137.
42. If not in harmony, and if the invoice was sent first, see id. at 49, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at
1136, there would be conflicting terms, and the Code term under U.C.C. § 2-509(1)(b) places the
risk of loss on the seller until destination, as the court held. Otherwise, the court might have
considered the invoice term an "agreement otherwise" under U.C.C. § 2-509(4). If so, why was it
not a "material alteration"? If the shipment occurred first, constituting an acceptance of the
purchase order, the invoice could only be a U.C.C. § 2-209(1) request for modification.
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South Hampton Co. v. Stinnes Corp. 43 adds a desirable gloss to U.C.C.
section 2-206(1 )(a). 44 Though performance may be a reasonable manner of
acceptance, when the particular performance occurs under circumstances that
cause the offeror reasonably to doubt whether the performance is intended as an
acceptance, a refusal of the offeree to confirm that intention will preclude the
performance from operating as an acceptance.
]. Baranello & Sons v. Hausmann Industries, lnc. 45 indicates the care with
.which courts expect the parties to express themselves. The negotiations started
with a telephone bid from a subcontractor to supply a bidding contractor with
certain wardrobes that differed in only one respect from the state's required
design. The subcontractor claimed that its design would meet state approval. It
developed that it would not. After much discussion and attempts to gain state
approval, the contractor wrote the subcontractor a letter expressly superseding
prior letters, specifying that all work would be in accordance with state
specifications and increasing the price by $17 ,375. The subcontractor replied
with a letter three days later indicating that the additional cost of $17,375 was
for "[a]dditional costs for amending specifications, method of assembly and
construction of wardrobes to meet F.D.C. [state] requirements." 46 But objection
was made to the subcontractor's drawings, and it could not satisfy the state.
When sued, the subcontractor argued that its letter was not intended to
constitute an acceptance and that the parties had not reached agreement on the
logistics of shipping the wardrobes to a third party who was to supply certain
molding. The court ruled that defendant's subjective intent was irrelevant, that
there was an objective intent to contract, even with a material term left open, 47
and that because of defendant's refusal to comply, the court could fashion a
remedy.

43. 733 F.2d 1108, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1137 (5th Cir. 1984).
44. The contract was for a ten-year period. Buyer had an option to cancel if seller did not build
certain facilities to bring the oil to buyer by pipeline. Seller had the option to accept the cancellation
or offer oil from another source for the balance of the contract. Proper notice of cancellation was
given when the facilities were not constructed, but seller refused to accept it and continued deliveries
from an alternate source. Buyer inquired whether seller was exercising its option to complete the
contract from that alternate source. Seller merely replied that oil was available. After some
negotiations between buyer, seller, and the users buying from Stinnes, all buyers cancelled and seller
sued; buyer counterclaimed. Seller claimed it had exercised its contract by conduct. The court found
otherwise.
45. 571 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
46. Id. at 338.
47. The court quoted from Kleinschmidt Div. of SCM Corp. v. Futuronics Corp., 41 N.Y.2d
972, 363 N.E.2d 701, 395 N.Y.S.2d 151, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 422 (1977): "It is no
longer true that dispute over material terms inevitably prevents formation of a binding contract.
What is true ... is that when a dispute over material terms manifests a lack of intention to contract,
no contract results." 571 F. Supp. at 341. If the term prevents the court from fashioning a remedy,
lack of objective intention to contract is conclusive.
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INDEFINITENESS AND OPEN TERMS
Many contract terms left open by the parties can be supplied if the words and
conduct of the parties, considered objectively, establish the requisite intent to
contract and if there is a reasonably certain basis on which to construct a
remedy.
Three cases dealt with the parties' failure to define the duration of their
contractual relationship.' 8 U.C.C. section 2-309(2) provides that such a contract
is valid for a reasonable time though terminable by either party at any time
subject to the reasonable notice requirement of U.C.C. section 2-309(3). The
cases confirm that the reasonableness of a time period is a question of fact. In
one case, the trial judge ruled that termination of a distributorship occurred
prematurely.'9 The Ninth Circuit ruled, correctly, that such a contract was
terminable at the will of either party. The only requirements were that the
notice be sent in good faith and that the reasonableness of the notice period be
judged by the amount of time necessary to look for a new source of supply.
In re Pennsylvania Tire Co. 60 illustrates the many problems that occur in the
termination of a multiproduct distributorship agreement. First, the bankruptcy
judge held that since the parties had dealt with each other for ten years, the
reasonable period for validity had run. Relying on a clause in the agreement
and oral testimony, the judge ruled that the parties had agreed on termination
without any prior notice. As to U.C.C. section 2-309(2), he then said, "Indeed it
is possible to find that, as between seasoned merchants, certainly an apt
description of these parties, termination without prior notice is not commercially
unreasonable" 61 and so not unconscionable. Then the judge, relying on preCode agency law, buttressed his holding of no liability by stating that "any
agreement found to exist is unenforceable for lack of mutuality." 62
Apparently, a different result could have been reached under U.C.C. section
2-306 had the distributor been given an exclusive territory or had it handled
only the supplier's tires. 63 The court did hold that the distributor was entitled to
a setoff for future adjustments it would have to make with those who had
purchased tires from it and who would, based on past experience, have claims.
Also, the supplier was awarded interest on unpaid invoices, but only at the
statutory rate of 6% to July 30, 1980, and 8% thereafter, 64 not at the rates of
12 % to 20 % that it had charged. Interest on past-due invoices was not charged
until late in 1979, and no payments of such interest had been made by the
48. Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Inc., 719 F.2d 1465, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 466 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Pennsylvania Tire Co., 26 Bankr. 663, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Mayflower Farms v. Tech-Mark, Inc., 64 Or. App.
121, 666 P.2d 1384, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 25 (1983).
49. Zidell Explorations, 719 F.2d 1465, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 466.
50. 26 Bankr. 663, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
51. Id. at 670, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 419.
52. Id. at 671, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 419.
53. U.C.C. § 2-306(2) ends the lack of mutuality argument by creating a best efforts obligation
on the part of each party.
54. 26 Bankr. at 669; 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 416.
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distributor. Hence, the supplier failed in its attempt to justify its higher-thanstatutory rates of interest based on course of performance and the distributor's
failure to object.
Lapeyrouse Grain Corp. v. Tallant 55 involved farmers delivering grain to a
dealer's storage bins under an oral agreement and a course of dealing that the
grain was "unpriced," meaning that there was no sale until the farmers fixed
the price. No specific pricing date was fixed. The dealer sent checks to the
farmers based on its theretofore-undisclosed "cut-off date," a date on which the
price was two cents a bushel lower than the day before and eight cents lower
than on the following day. The farmers sued in conversion. The court held that
the farmers' testimony was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether
the arrangement was a bailment or a sale. A judgment in conversion for the
farmers was affirmed. 56
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Industries, Inc., 57 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed by necessity, on a two-to-two vote, a ruling of no
contract. As the trial judge noted with some amazement, "The claim in excess of
95 million dollars, together with a counterclaim, is based on a two-page letter
between two giant corporations." 58 The letter, signed at the ceremonial signing
of a major contract for the purchase of one vessel, led to a dispute whether it was
an enforceable option or merely an agreement to negotiate an option. By its
express terms, the letter was "an offer to enter into an option agreement" 59 to
have Litton construct one to five additional vessels for Bethlehem. But several
terms were left open. 60 Subsequent negotiations on the open terms were unsuc-

.i

55. 439 So. 2d 105, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 405 (Ala. 1983).
56. The court said: "We find that the evidence of record concerning the storage agreement is
sufficient to present a jury question as to whether the delivery was a bailment or a sale." Id. at 109,
37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 408.
57. No. 37 W.D. Appeal Docket 1984 (Pa. Feb. 22, 1985) aff'g by necessity 321 Pa. Super. 357,
468 A.2d 748, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1059 (1983). Three supreme court justices took no
part; two voted to affirm; and two, to reverse.
58. 321 Pa. Super. at 361, 468 A.2d at 749, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1062.
59. Plaintiff's exh. 4. Id. at 363, 468 A.2d at 750, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1062. "We hereby
extend to you an offer to enter into an option agreement." Id. at 362, 468 A.2d at 750, 37 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 1062. Bethlehem replied, "We ... accept your offer of an option." Id. at 364, 468
A.2d at 751, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1064. Two justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
hold that the acceptance did not meet the offer. The two justices stated, but then ignored the fact,
that Litton signed the Bethlehem letter under the words, "Agreed to."
60. Among the terms left open was a mutually agreed-upon index for price escalation "such as"
two mentioned indices. At the time of the exercise of the option, an "appropriate clause" was to be
included in the contract to provide for quarterly escalations. The terms and specifications, after
reference to an attached set, were to contain "any other mutually agreed to terms and conditions"
and a clause giving Bethlehem the right to cancel "upon payment of costs." The district judge in the
Western District of Pennsylvania was undoubtedly aware of the difficulties price escalation can
cause, from that district's experience in Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) I (W.D. Pa. 1980) (settled after argument on appeal with an
agreed vacation of the order of the district court). The district judge stated that one ground of his
decision was that, on the evidence before him, there was no basis on which the missing terms could
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cessful, and Bethlehem sued. The proper issue, of course, is whether each party
had sufficiently manifested an intent to have an open price contract.
By a four-to-three vote, a seven-judge panel of Pennsylvania's superior court
affirmed the no-contract decision of the trial court. The superior court held that
the requisite intent to enter into a binding agreement was absent because so
many terms were left to future negotiation. In addition, even if the intent could
be found, the indefiniteness caused by the number of open terms could not be
remedied under U.C.C. section 2-204(3) because there was no reasonably
certain basis for filling in those terms consistently with what was expressed to
provide an appropriate remedy. 61 The two supreme court justices who voted for
affirmance found no contract because "an offer to enter into an option agreement" was not accepted by a letter stating, "we accept the option," even though
the purported acceptance was signed "agreed to" by the original offeror. The
trial court's finding of a lack of intent to have a contract with open price terms
was also affirmed by the two voting for affirmance. Missed was an opportunity
to rule that when the manifest intent was not to follow the Code's "gap filler"
result, the court should risk that only an "agreement to agree'" had been made
subject only to an obligation to negotiate in good faith.

THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
That U.C.C. section 2-207 was not intended for use when major terms are in
dispute is a lesson of Howard Construction Co. v. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc., 62 in
which the response to the seller's proposal was a purchase order containing
considerable price changes. The purchase order was not construed as an
expression of acceptance of the proposal. Even if it had been so construed under
U.C.C. section 2-305, there was no evidence of an intent to contract with an
open price term, and no real basis for a court to fashion a remedy. 63
Courts continue to require a strict adherence to the Code language that an
expression of acceptance, in order not to "operate as an acceptance," must
expressly make the acceptance conditional on the recipient's assent to the
additional or different terms. 64
But subsection 2-207(2)(a) states that terms in a form that contains a definite
expression of acceptance do not become part of the contract if "[t]he offer
expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer." Hence, it is important to
determine, when three forms are used, which is the "offer" and which the
be supplied consistently with the expressed intent of the parties. It is unfortunate that the supreme
court did not elaborate on this point.
61. 321 Pa. Super. at 371, 468 A.2d at 755, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1069.
62. 669 S.W.2d 221, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1040 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
63. As to the statute of frauds, the court said that "[n]one of the writings, whether analyzed
separately or in conjunction with each other allows for the inference that an agreement was reached
... ."Id. at 230, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1050.
64. Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 588 F. Supp. 1280, 38 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Hanford Foundry Co. v. Fuller Co., 38 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1553 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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"acceptance." This was done in Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General
Electric Co. 65 In that case, RMT submitted numerous quotations to GE. GE
then submitted a purchase order to RMT. RMT responded with its own
acknowledgment of order form. Both RMT's quotations and acknowledgment
of order form contained its standard terms. With its acknowledgment, RMT
also objected to GE's delivery term. GE's purchase order contained the following clause: "Acceptance of this order is expressly limited to the conditions of
purchase printed on the reverse side."
Relying on a statement by]. White and R. Summers that, generally, the first
document to be sent is the offer, the court found that the quotations by RMT
were the offers. If the property "is accurately defined and an amount stated as
the price in a communication ... to one person individually," Williston would
call it an offer. 66 But when quotations are solicited and submitted, the businessman's conception may be different. 67 It is noteworthy that the clause, which the
court ruled did not make the purchase order an acceptance expressly conditioned on assent, is in exact compliance with what U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a)
requires if an offer is to nullify the effect of changed terms in an acceptance. It is
also questionable that the purchase order contained any "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance." The strictness applied to the wording necessary
to comply with the "unless" clause in U.C.C. section 2-207( 1) is apparently not
to be applied to the determination of whether there is a definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance.
Adopting Summers' view that U.C.C. section 2-207(2) does not apply to
different terms, the court, because the parties dealt for a while as if a contract
existed, moved to U.C.C. section 2-207(3) and cancelled the different terms,
which related to delivery and termination. It applied, instead, U.C.C. section 2309 on delivery and U.C.C. section 2-610 on anticipatory repudiation and
entered judgment against GE.
The case illustrates the importance of selecting the form to be characterized
as the offer. While the result reflected the intent of the parties, it illustrates a
major weakness in the structure of U.C.C. section 2-207 when a counteroffer is
intended. The section allows an offeror to submit a form with the qualifying
language of U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a) and increases the likelihood that its
terms and conditions will apply to the contract of sale. If this result is not
desired, the offeree must always make a counteroffer by using the exact
language of the "unless" clause in U.C.C. section 2-207(1), lest it be deemed to
have accepted the offeror's provisions. If the offeror uses the "you can accept
only on my terms" approach, and the offeree uses the "unless" clause, there will
be no contract absent conduct after the exchange of forms. But should such
65. 585 F. Supp. 1097, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1518 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
66. See J. White & R. Summers, The Uniform Commercial Code 27 (2d ed. 1980); Williston
on Contracts § 27 (3d ed. 1957).
67. Businessmen frequently consider a quotation as no more than an invitation to the recipient
to submit an offer, and for that reason neglect to include any number of important terms. See 1 A.
Corbin, Contracts § 26, at 77 ( 1963 ).
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conduct trigger U.C.C. section 2-207(3 ), or should it constitute a traditional
common law acceptance of the counteroffer? The Code does not say.
Another troublesome subsection is U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(b), which is
applicable if neither party's form uses the appropriate magic qualifying language, both are merchants, 68 and neither reads the other's terms. The issue then
boils down to what terms would be "material alterations."
In one case, 69 there was an oral contract followed by a written confirmation
signed by both parties containing a disclaimer of warranties. The trial court
found the disclaimer ineffective because U.C.C. section 2-207 could not be used
to supply the element of explicit negotiation and bargaining required in the
state of Washington for an effective disclaimer. 70
In another case, 71 the Tenth Circuit, applying Kansas law, reversed a trial
court's ruling that materiality was an issue of fact. The court also held that
defendants were entitled to introduce evidence of a trade usage covering a
"replacement or credit" limitation of liability 72 and could use an invoice signed
by both parties to impeach the president's testimony that he was not aware of
the limitation. The unsigned invoices, the court said, constituted course-ofdealing evidence for the jury to weigh on the issue of express agreement to the
limitation of remedy.
Two recent cases have indicated that a forum selection clause73 and a clause
specifying the terms of shipment, 74 as well as warranty and limitation of liability
clauses, may be held to be material alterations.
United States ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Construction Aggregates
Corp. 15 involved a double application of U.C.C. section 2-207. An oral contract
for the sale of limestone was reached on April 1, 197 6, and, thereafter, further
documents were exchanged. On April 21, 197 6, plaintiff sent a purchase order
specifically requiring defendant to supply all the limestone from its primary
quarry. Defendant's letter of April 29 stated that it would use its best efforts to
supply the limestone from its primary quarry but could not guarantee to do so.
The court treated defendant's letter as a U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(c) objection to
plaintiff's single-source requirement, thus deleting the additional term. Turning
to ,subsection (2) again, defendant's best efforts clause constituted a "counter
68. In re Kolob Lumber Co., 34 Bankr. 426, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1075 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1983).
69. Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 Wash. App. 99, 666 P.2d 899, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
42 (1983).
70. Id. at 106, 666 P.2d at 903, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 47.
71. Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1076 (10th Cir. 1983).
72. Id. at 765, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1086.
73. Product Components, Inc. v. Regency Door & Hardware, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Ind.
1983).
74. Jn re Isis Foods, Inc., 38 Bankr. 48, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1134 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1983).
75. 559 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Mich. 1983), ajj'd in part and rev'd in part, 738 F.2d 440 (6th Cir.
1984).
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proposal" for an addition to the contract that did not materially alter the
contract and thus became a part of it as plaintiff did not object and its purchase
order did not contain the qualifying language of U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a). 76

WARRANTIES

WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS
Even when warranty disclaimer provisions become a part of the parties'
agreement, overriding circumstances can limit their applicability. For example,
in Tinker u. De Maria Porsche Audi, Inc., 77 warranty disclaimers were held to
be ineffective in negating a claim based upon alleged fraudulent representations
made by the seller of a second-hand vehicle. The seller had represented that the
vehicle was in good operating condition and had not been involved in any major
collision. When it was discovered that the car was titled as a "parts car," the
purchaser initiated an action based in part upon fraud in the inducement. The
trial court entered judgment for the seller notwithstanding the verdict, but the
court of appeals reversed, holding that a waiver of oral representations contained in the written sales agreement could not effectively bar claims amounting
to fraud in the inducement. 78
Finally, recent cases have also demonstrated the types of problems that may
arise after the sale has been consummated. In Temple u. Velcro USA, Inc., 79 the
worst fears of Velcro came to fruition when the plaintiff's husband was killed in
the crash of a hot-air balloon that had incorporated a Velcro fastener to secure
the deflation panels. Velcro had not been involved in the production of hot-air
balloons, and when it discovered that its products were being used for such
purposes, it attempted to have the FAA issue an airworthiness directive calling
attention to the dangers of such usage. The FAA refused to issue such a
directive, and Velcro subsequently mailed a warning to all known registered
owners of hot-air balloons using its product that the product should not be used
with hot-air balloons. The plaintiff's husband had received the notice and,
despite such warnings, continued to use the hot-air balloon. In upholding the
summary judgment in favor of Velcro, the court noted that the warning given by
Velcro was adequate to defeat claims based on express or implied warranties. 80
Other postsale actions of the seller with regard to warranty claims can also
adversely affect the seller, as was demonstrated in the case of Oregon Bank v.
Nautilus Crane & Equipment Corp. 81 The court held that, just as the provisions of U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(c) could operate to disclaim an implied
warranty, so a course of performance could waive the warranty disclaimers,
76. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) reads: "Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer."
77. 459 So. 2d 487, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
78. Id. at 492, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1525.
79. 148 Cal. App. 3d 1090, 196 Cal. Rptr. 531, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1108 (1983).
80. The notice was also held effective against strict liability and negligence claims.
81. 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1163 (1984).
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thereby reinstating the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. As a result, summary judgment in favor of the seller was
reversed.
The standard warranty waiver provisions found in U.C.C. section 2-316
continue to be limited by consumer-oriented legislation that either amends the
section or provides specific consumer protection laws that supersede the section's
application. Connecticut has recently modified U.C.C. section 2-316 to prohibit
disclaimer of warranties involving sales of new or unused consumer goods
unless they are marked "irregular," "factory seconds,'' or "damaged,'' 82 and of
all implied warranties. New Hampshire has also amended U.C.C. section 2-316
to prohibit disclaimers on sales of consumer goods by merchants unless a
disclaimer that the consumer has signed is given to the consumer. 83 Finally, Dale
v. King Lincoln-Mercury, lnc. 84 ruled that the Kansas Consumer Protection
Act 85 prevents an express warranty contained in the sales contract from limiting
the implied warranty of merchantability in cases involving consumer goods.

WARRANTY BENEFICIARIES
The three alternatives of U.C.C. section 2-318 inserted in 1956 affected only
horizontal privity. The majority of the states adopted Alternative A, which
covers only the "family or household" of the buyer and is limited to personal
injuries. In Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, 86 an Illinois appellate
court refused to extend privity to employees of the U.S. Postal Office despite a
judicially created "family" relationship between a corporation and its employees. 87 Similarly, in Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 88 the
Kansas Supreme Court held that under Alternative A a corporate plaintiff suing
for lost profits and other economic loss was not injured in person "and so not .a
third party beneficiary" of the impleaded manufacturer's warranties.
An interesting distinction appears in N. Feldman & Son v. Checker Motors
Corp. 89 In that case, defendant General Motors Corp., a seller of diesel engines
82. Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 42a-2-316 (1984).
83. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 38-A:2-316(4) (1961 & Supp. 1983).
84. 234 Kan. 840, 676 P.2d 744, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (1984).
85. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-639 ( 1980).
86. 118 Ill. App. 3d 520, 455 N.E.2d 142, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1116 (1983).
Alternatively, the court held that they were not employees of the subcontractor purchaser of the
conveyor belt system installed in the post office. Cf Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1177 (Iowa 1984) (economic
loss not recoverable as warranty beneficiaries by retail stores losing trade because of defective steel in
a bridge); Pronti v. DML of Elmira, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 156, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 455
(App. Div. 1984) (no implied warranty from a manufacturer to a subpurchaser when no personal
injury involved).
87. Cf. Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 388 (1964); Barfield v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 197 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 459 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1073 (1974).
88. 234 Kan. 742, 675 P.2d 887, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 69 (1984).
89. 572 F. Supp. 310, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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to Checker, moved for summary judgment. Applying Michigan law, the court
denied General Motors' motion with respect to the express warranty count but
granted the motion with respect to the implied warranty of merchantability
count. Under Michigan's version of sections 2-314 and 2-318 of the Code,
implied warranties extend only to the family or household of the immediate
buyer, who cannot recover for economic loss. However, specific representations
do extend to a remote buyer if proved to be a part of the basis of the bargain,
and economic loss is then recove.rable.
Florida's privity rule was considered by a panel of its Third District Court of
Appeal in GAF Corp. v. Zack Co. 90 Recovery against a seller once removed from
plaintiff purchaser was denied. In a second case, Cedars of Lebanon Hospital
Corp. v. European X-Ray Distributors of America, Inc., 91 another panel (on
which sat one judge from the GAF case) traced the erosion, in both Florida and
general law, of the privity requirement. In the absence of a clear statement by
the Florida legislature that its version of U.C.C. section 2-318 was intended to
abrogate all of Florida's pre-Code exceptions to privity, the court applied one to
permit recovery against the remote manufacturer that had made direct representations to the hospital to induce it to buy x-ray equipment from a distributor. A
footnote to the opinion emphasizes that the decision rests on direct contact
between the manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser; absent direct contact,
lack of privity would, it said, still defeat recovery. 92

TITLE, CREDITORS, AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS
In Monsanto Co. v. Walter E. Heller &- Co., 93 the court held that Heller was
not a good faith buyer obtaining a better title than its transferor because Heller
knew that its debtor was buying on credit, had an understanding with the credit
seller that Heller would advance sufficient funds to pay for the purchases, and
had given the credit seller reason to rely on the continuation of that practice.
The opinion underscores the rule that in connection with merchants, at least in
article 2 cases, a higher standard of good faith is required than for nonmerchants.
The prior owner's attempt to recover failed in Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc. 94 The Fifth Circuit decided that the cash sale rule, when the
seller was not paid, did not result, as some cases have held, in a void transaction,
but in a transaction void only as between the parties, which did not negate the
title of a good faith purchaser from the nonpaying buyer. 95 In Shell Oil Co. v.
Mills Oil Co., 96 the unpaid credit seller contended that a bank with an inventory
90. 445 So. 2d 350, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
91. 444 So. 2d 1068, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
92. Id. at 1072 n.4, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 47 n.5.
93. 114 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 449 N.E.2d 993, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 834 (1983).
94. 704 F.2d 1351, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 819 (5th Cir.), modified, 715 F.2d 996
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1288 (1984).
95. 704 F.2d at 1362, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 826.
96. 717 F.2d 208, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 116 (5th Cir. 1983).
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lien was not a bona fide purchaser because it had in the past honored the credit
buyer's drafts, even if overdrafts, and had not informed the credit seller that it
was refusing further credit to the buyer. The court held that a greater connection with the wrongful activities of the buyer was needed in order to find a
triable issue as to lack of good faith.
An attempt to defeat the application of U.C.C. section 2-326 by implying that
the consignee must be a seller of the consignor's goods, even though a seller of
similar goods, failed in a Florida appeals court case, 97 and creditors of the
consignee prevailed. The goods were delivered to the operator of a warehouse
facility under a contract using the term "consigned," providing for the passage
of risk of loss upon delivery to the warehouse, and requiring the warehouse
operator to assist the owner of the goods "in any reasonable manner to protect
the interest of Defendant [owner] 'in this consignment transaction including,
but not limited to, execution [of] financing statement, posting of signs under a
sign law, and otherwise.' " 98 No such action was taken. Sales were made and
invoices sent only by the owner. The warehouse operator had no authority to
sell, but when delivery was accomplished the operator did notify the owner and
did receive an eight percent commission on the sales. The warehouse operator
conducted a sales business for similar items on its premises and under its own
name. In Simonds-Shields-Theis Grain Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., 99 SST hired a
trucker known to it to be a "sometime" dealer in soybeans to deliver beans
under a contract it had with FMC. When delivering the grain, the trucker
represented it as his own and was paid. SST's conversion action against the
buyer from the trucker was defeated. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the policy of
U.C.C. sections 2-403(2) and (3) extends to one engaged in "occasional merchandising." Recovery was also defeated on common law agency and estoppel
princi pies. 100

TENDER, CURE, AND NOTICE OF BREACH
U.C.C. section 2-602 allows for rejection of goods "within a reasonable time
after their delivery." During discussion of "overheating," when a new truck
with a snowplow attachment was tested, the buyer was told that readjustment of

97. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 440 So. 2d 666, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
98. Id. at 667, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 737.
99. 575 F. Supp. 290, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1547 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
100. The court said:
A Fifth Circuit decision notes that "the phrase 'or had power to transfer' in section 2-403( 1)
makes clear that common-law concepts of agency and estoppel (based on actual or apparent
authority) may be invoked by a party who purchases goods from an agent or apparent agent of
the true owner."

Id. at 293, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1551 (quoting American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National
Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248, 266 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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the position of the blade would cure the problem. 101 Sale papers were signed,
and a full payment check was given. But the overheating continued and was not
cured. The buyer immediately notified the seller that it was not taking the truck,
told the seller it was stopping payment on the check (it did so), and told the
seller to repossess the truck.
Instead, claiming acceptance by the buyer, seller processed the title papers,
and title was duly issued in buyer's name. The court held that the case was one
of rejection, that "[a] 'reasonable time to inspect' under the UCC must allow an
opportunity to put the product to its intended use, or for testing to verify its
capability to perform as intended." 102 The notice given was sufficient because it
indicated the relief wanted and was timely for the purpose.
The conflict between two sentences in comment 4 to U.C.C. section 2-607
regarding the required content of notice continues to cause trouble. 103 One group
of cases relating to warranties follows the "still troublesome" first sentence. 104
Another group follows the "claimed to involve a breach" rule of the last
sentence. 105
Without regard to the slightly different language regarding notice in U.C.C.
section 2-608(2), cases frequently use the same tripartite statement of the
purposes of notice 106 found in comment 5 to this section, perhaps because it
seems to imply that the purposes are the same.
As to the timing of the notice, there are examples of a division between cases
treating the notice as a "condition precedent to suit" in order to afford time for

101. Capitol Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 114 (1983).
102. Id. at 119.
103. The first sentence of the second paragraph of comment 4 reads: "The content of notification
need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched." The last sentence states: "The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this
Article need only be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach,
and thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation."
104. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 37 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 429 (11th Cir. 1983); International Technical Instruments, Inc. v. Engineering
Measurements Co., 678 P.2d 558, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 868 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
105. Speakman Co. v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 469 (D. Del. 1984); Barrington Corp. v. Patrick Lumber Co., 447 So. 2d 785, 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 744 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Agway, Inc. v. Teitscheid, 144 Vt. 76,
472 A.2d 1250, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 818 (1984).
106. Comment 5 indicates that the "purposes" of the requirement of notice are "considerations
of good faith, prevention of surprise, and reasonable adjustment." It has been said that these
purposes are met if the notice informs the seller that the buyer has revoked, giving identification of
the particular goods he has revoked and setting forth the nature of the nonconformity. Solar Kinetics
Corp. v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1237, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 85
(D. Conn. 1980).
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settlement 107 and those holding that a timely filing of suit satisfies the notice
requirement. 108
Smith v. Stewart 109 involved the purchase of a yacht. Neither party was a
merchant, but the seller gave an express warranty against any dry rot discovered
within six months. Three days after delivery of the boat, the buyer notified the
seller of a fuel tank leak and requested defrayal of the expense of repairing the
tank. In the ensuing discussions, congeniality turned to hostility, and both
parties retained attorneys. A few days before the end of the six-month period,
dry rot was discovered, but the seller was not notified. About three weeks later,
buyer filed suit for both the fuel tank repairs and the dry rot. The trial court
entered summary judgment for seller on all claims because there was no implied
warranty of merchantability since the seller was not a "boat-merchant," and
also because buyer had given no notice of breach regarding the dry rot.
The Kansas Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed as to the fuel tank leak and
reversed as to the dry rot. Adopting the White and Summers view of the
purposes behind the notice requirement, 110 the court had to face the extensive
case law and scholarly comment supporting the condition precedent approach
with its personal injury relaxation 111 and its third-party beneficiary exception. 112
Without expressly creating an "already in a hostile position" exception to the
notice rules as such, the court held that filing suit constituted sufficient notice in
this case.
In Shooshanian v. Wagner, 113 the Alaska Supreme Court said in a consumer
breach of warranty suit, "The filing of a complaint is certainly not a bar to the
negotiation and settlement of claims. To the contrary, the prospect of going to
trial is often a powerful incentive to a defendant to investigate the claims against
it and to arrive at a reasonable agreement." 114 The court, in reversing an order
dismissing a complaint with prejudice, also said that a defendant could more
easily prepare for either settlement or trial through the use of pretrial discovery
techniques. The court added that "[a]llowing a consumer's complaint to serve as
notice will not prevent a defendant manufacturer from raising the issue of
timeliness if it has been prejudiced by an unreasonable delay." 115

107. The court in Smith v. Stewart, 233 Kan. 904, 667 P.2d 358, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1141 (1983), was generally supportive of this view.
108. Owens v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp. 32, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. (Callaghan) 903
(S.D. Ill. 1984); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1150 (Colo. 1984).
109. 233 Kan. 904, 667 P.2d 358, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1141 (1983).
110. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 66, § 11-10.
111. See generally id.
112. Id.
113. 672 P.2d 455, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 55 (Alaska 1983).
114. Id. at 462-63, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 59.
115. Id. at 463, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 59-60.
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A notice once given may have to be renewed if buyer's intervening conduct
lulls a reasonable seller into believing that the defect has been cured or has
disappeared. 116
The intermesh of a buyer's right to revoke acceptance and a seller's right to
cure by replacement rather than repair was before the Texas Supreme Court in
Gappelberg v. Landrum. 117 The intermediate appellate court, reversing the trial
court, had distinguished cases denying the right to cure on the ground that they
involved only the right to cure by repair. It held that the "spirit of the Code"
required the allowance of cure by complete replacement. The supreme court
reversed, citing Zabriskie Chevrolet Inc. v. Smith 118 for its theory of "shaken
faith" in a product, in this case a large-screen television, that had an undiscovered substantial defect when accepted.

REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
The demand for assurances provision, U.C.C. section 2-609, was considered
in Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co. 119 The Canal
Company had chartered a tug with an option to purchase. Nineteen days before
the final charter payment was due, the Canal Company wrote the owner that it
had discovered that one of the mortgages on the tug was in default and
demanded assurances that clear title to the tug would be available on or before
the date for the exercise of the option. It stated that it was withholding
payments until it received assurances and did so. No answer was given except
by a suit, filed two days after the due date of the payment, for the return of the
boat. The district court gave judgment to the now-bankrupt plaintiff.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the U.C.C. governed the contract for
sale under federal law, whether common law or admiralty. The owner claimed
that, under U.C.C. section 2-609, withholding payment was not "commercially
reasonable" as the Canal Company had made no investigation of the owner's
financial condition and payments on the mortgages could obviously be made
from the lease rentals. 120 The court held that if the owner was in fine financial
shape, all it had to do in response to the request for assurances "was to explain
the situation." The standard for demanding assurances is "one of reasonable
insecurity, not absolute certainty." 121 The withholding of payment (suspension
of performance) was reasonable when the request for assurances was greeted by
absolute silence.

116. Agway, Inc. v. Teitscheid, 144 Vt. 76, 472 A.2d 1250, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
818 (1984 ).
117. 666 S.W.2d 88, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1563 (Tex. 1984).
118. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 30 (1968).
119. 730 F.2d 186, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 490 (5th Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 190, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 496.
121. Id. at 191, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 497.
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Consolidated Edison Co. v. Charles F. Guyon, Inc. 122 shows that the party
giving assurances can go too far. Defendant had contracted to supply a quantity
of fabricated piping but thereafter decided to shut down its fabricating division.
Consolidated Edison asked for a confirmation in nine days that the pipe would
still be supplied. U.C.C. section 2-609 provides that the demand for assurances
must be in writing but says nothing about how the assurances should be given.
Summary judgment on liability issues was granted, as the proffered oral
"assurances" were that defendant would place the order with another supplier
if Consolidated Edison would look solely to that supplier with respect to any
product liability for unfinished merchandise. 123 A proffered novation does not
constitute assurances.
The doctrine of impracticality of performance resulted in a reversal of a $5
million judgment due to improper jury instructions that, in effect, constituted
directed verdicts on certain issues in Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval International, Ltd. 124 The case arose from a termination of plaintiff's distributorship of
valves imported by Conval. Defendant did not fill two orders placed before
termination and urged impracticality as an excuse.
The Ninth Circuit construed the contract as one to supply from an agreed
source, since prices were tied to prices charged defendant by a specified
Yugoslavian company. The court then ruled that the failure to supply by the
agreed source would constitute impracticality only if defendant had used all due
measures to assure that its supplier would perform, and the evidence on that
issue raised a jury question.
The second and more interesting aspect was the failure of Conval to assign to
Zidell all of Conval's rights against the supplier. Despite the comment's
statement that a condition of "making good the claim of excuse" is the assignment, the court declined to make the failure to assign a per se invalidation of the
impracticality excuse. The jury should decide, it ruled, whether in view of all
the circumstances there was any breach of good faith in failing to assign the
rights.
The gyrations in the world oil market in 1979 and thereafter have produced
at least three resorts to U.C.C. section 2-615, of which two will be discussed. In
Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminum International Corp., 125 a contract
for petroleum to be refined in Taiwan was involved. The contract contained a
force majeure clause, which excused a performance if the specified events
occurred before departure of the vessel from a loading port in the Persian Gulf.
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's holding that the force
majeure clause excused the seller if its supplier failed to supply "for any reason
whatsoever, as long as the vessel had not been loaded." The circuit court then
ruled that U.C.C. section 2-615 had no application as the events that occurred
122.
1984).
123.
124.
125.

98 A.D.2d 483, 471 N.Y.S.2d 269, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1132 (App. Div.
Id. at 484-85, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 270, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1132-33.
719 F.2d 1465, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 466 (9th Cir. 1983).
719 F.2d 992, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 779 (9th Cir. 1983).
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were foreseeable and the clause represented the parties' bargain as to who
should bear the loss. 126 The panel then held that the covenant of good faith,
which the California courts had read into force majeure clauses, does not
include the obligation to allow the buyer to succeed to the excused seller's rights
against its supplier. The windfall of any such recovery, based on the absence of
any excusing clause in seller's contract with its supplier, belonged to the seller
by reason of its superior bargaining.
In Nissho-lwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 127 a jury awarded Nissho
damages for Occidental's failure to deliver oil from Libya. Occidental urged as
excuses an embargo by the Libyan government and pipeline breakdowns. The
trial judge instructed the jury that it must find that the excusing event or events
were not reasonably within the control of Occidental or its supplier. The Fifth
Circuit held the instruction to be proper. The concept of an American jury
determining whether Occidental provoked Colonel Khadafy's actions or
whether his actions were beyond its reasonable control raises interesting speculations.

REMEDIES

REJECTION AND REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
In Bowlin 's Inc. v. Ramsay Oil Co., 128 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
upheld a contractual two-day clause for objection to deliveries of gasoline to
service stations. The claim of an unconscionably short time was defeated by a
showing that the purchaser's "Procedures for Verifying the Quantity of Gasoline Delivered to Your Store," if followed, would have enabled each outlet to
verify quantities within hours after delivery. 129
At the other end of the spectrum is Sumner v. Fel-Air, lnc., 130 in which
repeated assurances that a substantial defect would be cured worked to extend
the period for revocation of acceptance.
The "reasonable" time for rejection was extended in In re H.P. Tool
Manufacturing Corp. 131 In order for inspection to be made, the seller would
have had to depart from normal procedures, open each carton of tool sets, and
unroll the pouches. Hence, notice given after receipt of complaints from customers was timely and effective to revoke acceptance. The resales did not constitute
an improper exercise of dominion.
On the other hand, shoes are different from tool sets. In Lorenzo Ban.ft di
Ban.ft Renzo & Co. v. Davis Congress Shops, Inc., 132 rejection failed when
delivery was taken in early summer 1982 and notice of nonconformity was given
126.
127.
128.
1983).
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 999, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 788.

729 F.2d 1530, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1237 (5th Cir. 1984).
99 N.M. 660, 662 P.2d 661, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 11 to (N.M. Ct. App.
Id. at _ _ , 662 P.2d at 670, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1122.
680 P.2d 1109, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 91 (Alaska 1984).
37 Bankr. 885, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
568 F. Supp. 432, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1183 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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in mid-August, but the shoes were continuously offered for sale and half had
been sold by April 1983.

RECLAMATION
In Myers v. Columbus Sales Pavilion, lnc., 133 an unpaid cash seller sued the
buyer's auctioneer. The district court, affirmed by the Eighth Circuit on the
basis of the district court's opinion by Judge Urbom, ruled that under U.C.C.
section 2-507(2), title passed from seller to buyer, and that U.C.C. section 2401 ( 4) is an exclusive listing of the circumstances in which title, having passed,
is revested in a seller. U.C.C. section 2-507(2) was said to speak only of the
buyer's right, as against the seller, to retain or dispose of the purchased cattle, 134
not of a revesting of title. Hence, the rights of third parties were not affected and
the auctioneer committed no conversion, as the seller had no property interest in
the cattle.
A better approach would have applied the "innocent agent" rule to the
auctioneer 135 or have equated the position of the auctioneer to that of a good
faith purchaser.
Finally, the district court judge, Judge Urbom, had applied the Nebraska
statute 136 relieving an auctioneer of liability for conversion when selling personal
property at auction in good faith and without notice of a security interest,
provided that the principal is disclosed and the auctioneer has no interest in the
property except to act as an intermediary. The Eighth Circuit, however,
affirmed only the U.C.C. analysis leading to "no conversion." It then stated that
the portion of Judge Urbom's opinion considering the Nebraska statute "is to be
regarded as surplusage, and we express no view thereon." 137
The Tenth Circuit considered the effect of Kansas law on a secured party
dealing with a nonpaying buyer when reclamation was sought under U.C.C.
section 2-507(2). 138 It held that the return of the buyer's check defeated the
buyer's title, so that it never had rights in the purchased goods to support the
grant of a security interest. It then went on to rule, however, that because the
seller failed to pursue its right to reclaim diligently, the sale was no longer
conditional and the buyer could sell or give a security interest.
Unfortunately for the Tenth Circuit, the Kansas Supreme Court reached the
opposite result three months later in Iola State Bank v. Bolan. 139 Involved were
133. 575 F. Supp. 805, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1122 (D. Neb.), ajf'd, 723 F.2d 37,
37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1128 (8th Cir. 1983).
134. 575 F. Supp. at 808, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1125. District Judge Urbom ruled that
plaintiff could not recover in conversion as title had passed from plaintiff and U.C.C. § 2-507 did
not provide the unpaid seller even a security interest. Id., 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1125.
135. Compare the position of a selling agent or broker under U.C.C. §§ 3-417(4) and 3-419(3).
Compare also U.C.C. §§ 2-312(2) and 2-328(4), referring to auctioneer's principal as "the seller."
136. Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 69-109.01(Reissue1981).
137. 723 F.2d at 38, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1130.
138. Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 37 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1553 (10th Cir. 1983).
139. 235 Kan. 175, 679 P.2d 720, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 755 (1984).
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farmer sellers of grain, a merchant buyer, and the after-acquired property
clause of the bank's security agreement with the buyer. The court considered
that the Code radically changed the Kansas pre-Code "cash sale" rule from
"void" to "voidable." Thus, unpaid sellers in Kansas were now subject to the
claims of good faith purchasers from the nonpaying buyer. Unfortunately for it,
the bank that dishonored the checks was the same bank that claimed purchaser
status under its security agreement. The bank was found to have knowledge that
the funds in the account belonged to the farmers, so that its setoff of the buyer's
balance was distinctly not in good faith. The trial court's direction of a verdict in
favor of the farmers for both compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive
damages was sustained.
While the issue of good faith was not considered by the trial court or jury, the
appellate court ruled that the trial judge's findings made clear that the bank had
not acted honestly in fact; hence, as a matter of law, the bank was not a good
faith purchaser 140 and so had converted the farmers' money, a tort allowing
recovery of punitive damages.
The issue whether a secured party, claiming as a good faith purchaser, must
have advanced money after the goods were delivered, possibly implicit in the
two preceding cases, was thought by many to have been put to rest by In re
Samuels & Co. 141 Possibly emboldened by the rash of contrary statutes and the
federal enactment following that case, 142 Bankruptcy Judge Emil F. Goldhaber,
departing from the views of many of his colleagues, 143 ruled in Lavonia Manufacturing Corp. v. Emery Corp. (In re Emery Corp.)1 44 that a secured party, to
prevail over the reclaiming seller under U.C.C. section 2-702(3 ), must "take"
the interest by giving value during the period after receipt of the goods and
before the reclamation demand is made. 145
140. Id. at--, 679 P.2d at 730-31, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 767. Because a directed verdict
was the correct result even though the trial court's reasoning was not applicable, the court ruled that
the verdict should stand. Id. at _ _ , 679 P.2d at 731, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 767-68. The court
also ruled that the bank, because of its knowledge, had no common law or statutory right of setoff
against the farmers' funds. Id. at _ _ , 679 P.2d at 733-34, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 772.
141. 526 F.2d 1238, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 545 (5th Cir.); cert. denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976). The Kansas court cites 10 other opinions reaching the same result.
142. The initial adverse reaction to Samuels can be seen in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, §§ 9-138,
-139 (West Supp. 1984-1985); 3A Kan. Stat. Ann.§§ 47-1801, -1802 (1981); Ten. Civ. Code Ann.
tit. 121, art. 6910(b) (Vernon 1960), repealed in 1981 (Vernon Supp. 1985); 1976 Cal. Stat. 772
(Assembly Bill 3485). Then came the federal statute, Pub. L. No. 94-410, 90 Stat. 1249 (Sept. 13,
1976), explained in H.R. Rep. No. 94-1043 (Apr. 14, 1976).
143. See, for example, Judge Goldhaber's footnotes 9 and 10. Lavonia Mfg. Corp. v. Emery
Corp. (In re Emery Corp.), 38 Bankr. 489, 495, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 834, at 842-43
(Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1984).
144. 38 Bankr. 489, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 834 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). Contra In
re Bensar Co., 36 Bankr. 699, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 823 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
145. The judge posed two alternatives: first, that the U.C.C. displaced state common law and
that rights of creditors must be found under article 2 (Pennsylvania has the 1966 amendment to
U.C.C. § 2-702); and second, state law has not been displaced. Under Pennsylvania law, Mann v.
Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280 (1901), and In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 159 (3d Cir. 1960), the judge concluded that only a "reliance interest" is protected. He
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If electronic means are used to transmit the demand for reclamation, when is
the demand made? Montello Oil Corp. v. Marin Motor Oil, Inc. (In re Marin
Motor Oil Co.)1 46 involved a last day for demand on April 21, 1981. At 11 :04
p.m. that day, a telex was sent to the buyer and was received by Western
Union's office serving the buyer at 11:08 p.m. The message was not in readable
form until the buyer opened for business and turned on its machine at 9:04 a.m.
on April 22, 1981. The Third Circuit panel adopted a "dispatch" rule for the
timeliness of demands. Factors justifying its decision were said to be the
difficulty of proof of receipt, the uncertainty of proving just where the message
was between 11 :08 p.m. and 9:04 a.m. the next day, and the lack of any guiding
policy as to the purpose of a demand. The policy selected was that of favoring
certainty in the law. The opinion states that under a dispatch rule the method of
communication chosen by the seller must be commercially reasonable in the
light of past practices between the parties and in the industry. 147

BUYER'S MONEY REMEDIES; LIMITATIONS ON
REMEDIES AND DAMAGES
Although comment 2 to U.C.C. section 2-715 explicitly rejects the "tacit
agreement" test, defendants persistently argue that consequential damages are
recoverable only if they were contemplated at the time of contracting. Courts
continue to reject the argument. 148
In McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co.,1 49 the Oregon Supreme Court
reversed the intermediate appellate court's allowance, to a buyer revoking
acceptance, of the cost of renting a substitute automobile as "cover," and
remanded to determine if recovery could be had as consequential damages. It is
clear, however, that the rental was neither cover nor "incidental damages" and
could be recovered, if at all, only as consequential damages, subject to the
validity of a clause in the contract excluding consequential damages.
The remand will require Oregon to take a position on whether a revocation
of acceptance, when a repair or replacement limited remedy fails of its essential

analyzed U.C.C. § 2-702 to indicate that divestiture of the right to reclaim must be triggered by an
action of the purchaser or buyer in ordinary course occurring after delivery and before demand is
made. There are those on the subcommittee who believe that the judge is in error.
146. 740 F.2d 22n, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1425 (3d Cir. 1984).
147. The case also involved an issue as to the date the goods were "received" by the buyer. The
court applied U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c)'s definition of receipt, not as controlling state law, but as a rule
suitable for federal purposes. Thus, goods were not "received" while in the possession of a common
carrier, even one selected by the buyer. The seller's right of stoppage in transitu under U.C.C. § 2705 indicated that the buyer did not have unfettered possession; hence, there was no receipt until
delivery to a bailee acting exclusively for the buyer. Id. at 224-25, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1432-33.
148. See, e.g., Elar Invs., Inc. v. Southwest Culvert Co., 139 Ariz. 25, 28, 676 P.2d 659, 662, 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 138, 141 (1983).
149. 295 Or. 494, 668 P.2d 365, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 130 (1983) (en bane).
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purpose, also defeats the contractual exclusion of consequential damages. 160
Attacks on such exclusion clauses as "unconscionable" continue to fail in a
commercial context. 151
Barnard v. Compugraphic Corp. 152 joins with the cases holding that interest
on money borrowed to make a purchase is not recoverable when the buyer is
awarded lump sum damages. The rationale is that the awarded damages permit
a replacement purchase to be made without additional borrowing. But the
extended time factor where interest is paid without obtaining the benefit of use
of the product is ignored. On the other hand, interest on money borrowed to
make repairs because of defendant's breach qualifies as consequential damages.153 But for the breach, the money would not have been borrowed.
In Nezperce Storage Co. v. Zenner, 154 Nezperce bought wheat from Zenner,
who expressly warranted it to be spring wheat. Zenner knew that Nezperce
would process the grain into spring wheat seed and then resell it. Under their
contract, Zenner was obliged to indemnify Nezperce for losses suffered upon
resale. When the seed proved defective, Nezperce felt it was forced to settle with
its buyers. As the jury found that the settlement amounts were reasonable, the
court allowed their recovery as consequential damages. Without a finding that
the settlements were reasonable, recovery would ordinarily be denied. An
indemnity against loss ordinarily does not grant checking privileges on the
indemnitor.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS-INTERACTION OF
TORT, CONTRACT, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY
STATUTES
In view of the difficulty of distinguishing causes of action in contract from
those in tort, the four-year statute of limitations contained in U.C.C. section 2725 continues to spawn conflicting decisions. When the defect resulted solely in
economic loss, most courts thought U.C.C. section 2-725 governed, 155 even to the
150. Leary & Frisch, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions, Sales,
Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 39 Bus. Law. 1851, 1897 (1984) (discussing the existing
division of opinion).
151. Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1076 (10th Cir. 1983); Frantz Lithographic Serv., Inc. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 485 (E.D. Pa. 1984 ); In re Feder Li tho-Graphic Servs., Inc., 40 Bankr. 486, 39 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 495 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
152. 35 Wash. App. 414, 667 P.2d 117, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 141 (1983).
153. Metropolitan Transfer Station, Inc. v. Design Structures, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 532, 36
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 860 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
154. 105 Idaho 464, 670 P.2d 871, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 478 (1983).
155. Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. Corp., 707 F.2d 351, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 860 (8th Cir. 1983); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191Conn.150, 464 A.2d 18, 37
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 158 (1983). But see Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 191 N.J. Super. 22, 465 A.2d 530, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 62 (App. Div. 1983).
Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a request for a writ of certiorari, and its decision
(not available at this writing) should clarify the law in New Jersey and be of guidance elsewhere.
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exclusion of the jurisdiction's general limitations statute for breach of contract.166 If personal injury is the result, the only discernible trend is towards
uncertainty. Two federal district courts following the laws of Delaware 167 and
Indiana 168 found each state's enactment of U.C.C. section 2-725 applicable. In
contrast, federal courts employing the laws of Kansas 169 and Virginia 160 applied
the state statute of limitations applicable to tort or personal injury actions.
Opinion also continues divided on the proper statute of limitations when the
action is for indemnity. 161
Another aspect of U.C.C. section 2-725 involves the time of accrual of a cause
of action for breach of warranty. Although the accrual date is normally when
delivery is tendered, the Code also adopts a "time of discovery" rule "where a
warranty explicitly extends to future performance . . . and discovery of~t.he
breach must await the time of such performance." 162 An express warranty that
"(r]oof surface and installation shall be guaranteed unconditionally for a period
of five years and any leakage occurring within that time shall be promptly
repaired or replaced" was held to be such a warranty .163 Confusing the concepts
of warranty and remedy, the court then held that the cause of action did not
arise when the leak was discovered but when it became apparent that the
defendant would be unable to effectively repair or replace the roof.
Other decisions within this reporting period hold that neither a five-year
guarantee, 164 nor the commitment to future repair or replacement, 166 constitutes
a future warranty within the meaning of the U.C.C. section 2-725(2) exception.
156. Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1076 (10th Cir. 1983).
157. Sellon v. General Motors Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1094, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1169 (D. Del. 1983).
158. Tolen v. A.H. Robins Co., 570 F. Supp. 1146, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 790
(N.D. Ind. 1983).
159. Thomas v. Heinrich Equip. Corp., 563 F. Supp. 152, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
866 (D. Kan. 1983).
160. Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1569 (4th Cir.
1983).
161. Compare Anixter Bros. v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 947, 463 N.E.2d
913, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 28 (1984) (U.C.C. § 2-725 not applicable to implied
contract indemnity actions; five-year "other civil action" statute applies), with Perry v. Pioneer
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1274 (Utah 1984)
(ultimate buyer's action is for breach of warranty; hence, indemnity action barred by U .C.C. § 2725 ).
162. u.c.c. § 2-725(2).
163. Smith v. Union Supply Co., 675 P.2d 333, 334, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 795, 795
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
164. Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 214, 37 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
165. Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1266, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1222, 1228 (D. Del. 1983) ("Thus, the key distinction between these two kinds of
warranties is that a repair or replacement warranty merely provides a remedy if the product
becomes defective, while a warranty for future performance guarantees the performance of the
product itself for a stated period of time") (emphasis in original).
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Furthermore, the requirements for a future performance warranty were not met
by General Motors' warranty: "To help protect you, every Olds provides all
this for occupant protection ... Fuel Tank impact security." 166

BULK TRANSFERS
In those states that have adopted optional U.C.C. section 6-106, one problem
is how to distribute the proceeds of sale if they are insufficient to pay all claims
in full. Section 6-106(3) provides that "distribution shall be made pro rata." In
William lselin &- Co. v. Delta Auction &- Real Estate Co., 167 the court did not
apply this language literally and ruled that secured and judicial lien creditors
are entitled to priority in a distribution of proceeds. 168 Assuming that the
original judicial lien also extends to proceeds, as does a security interest, 169 the
court's conclusion seems correct. 170 There is no evidence that the drafters of
article 6 intended to alter existing priority schemes.
In In re Radcliffe's Warehouse Sales, lnc., 171 the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Washington held that section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code
did not extend the time for the trustee of the transferor to sue the transferee to
set aside a noncomplying bulk transfer. In reaching this conclusion, the court
disapproved of In re Curtina International, lnc. 172 and held that section 108(a)
did not apply because the right being asserted against the transferee is a right of
the creditors of the transferor/debtor, not the right of the debtor itself. Although
this is true, the trustee acquires his cause of action pursuant to section 544(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code, and section 546(a) gives the trustee two years within
which to sue. This should preempt the shorter article 6 period. Unfortunately,
the court in Radcliffe's did not discuss sections 544(b) and 546, and the court in
Curtina wrongly said that section 546 did not apply while section 108(a) did.
Two cases involved the scope of article 6. In one the Virginia Supreme Court
held an enterprise not subject to article 6 because, despite an extensive inventory
of replacement parts, its principal business was repairing radiators, a service,

166. Sellon v. General Motors Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1094, 1097, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1169, 1172(0. Del.1983).
167. 433 So. 2d 911, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 607 (Miss. 1983).
168. Accord Huguelet v. M & M Assocs., 375 So. 2d 1150, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Bomanzi of Lexington, Inc. v. Tafel, 415 S.W.2d 627, 4 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 588 (Ky. 1967); In re Bulk Sale of Clement, 98 Dauph. 55, 71 Pa. D. &
C.2d 717, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1280 (C.P. 1976).
169. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
170. At least one member of the subcommittee feels that theoretically § 6-106(3) should be
applied literally because the secured creditor can still foreclose on the collateral once it is in the
transferee's hands and, therefore, does not need to be given preferential treatment in the distribution
of the proceeds. Another member believes that the treatment should depend on whether the bulk
sales price was reduced by the secured debt, that is, whether the bulk sale was "under and subject"
or not.
171. 31 Bankr. 827, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 915 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
172. 23 Bankr. 969, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1311 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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and not the sale of merchandise from stock. 173 The other case involved a sale of
fixed assets and an option to purchase the inventory at a future date. There was
no compliance with article 6, but the transferee agreed to pay a secured party
some of the outstanding balance owed by the debtor. The court ruled that the
bulk transfer article does not regulate an agreement to sell inventory in the
future. Until sold, the inventory remains subject to the vendor's creditors.
Alternatively, a sale for the benefit of the secured party would also be exempt
even if to a third person by the debtor. 174

WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF LADING, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
There were no startlingly significant decisions under article 7.

173. Allsbrook v. Azalea Radiator Serv., Inc., 316 S.E.2d 743, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1714 (Va. 1984).
174. Ouachita Elec. Co-op v. Evans-St. Clair, 12 Ark. App. 171, 672 S.W.2d 660, 39 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 640 ( 1984 ).

